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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
J. L. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE-
MENT BOARD, LEROY E. COWLES, 
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, .JOSEPH 
CIIEZ, ALEX JEX, M I L T 0 N B. 
TAYLOR, D. A. WOOTTON, and J. R. 
SMITH~ Members Thereof, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, for the past thirty-four years, 
has been and is now employed as a teacher by the 
public schools of the State of Utah. That 
'plaintiff has been for many years .and is now 
Dean of the School of Arts and SCiences and Pro-
fessor of Mathematics at the University of Utah. 
That on or about the 1st day of Novembflr, 
1923, plaintiff became the holder of a retirement 
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tannuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance & 
Annuity Association of America. That from the 1st 
day of November, 1923, and up to the 29th day of 
December, 1937, the University of Utah contributed 
and paid one-half of the premiums ( $180.00 a year 
for fourteen years and two months) on said contract 
in the total amount of Two Thousand Five Hun-
dred Fifty ($2,550.00) Dollars. That the plaintiff 
and the University of Utah, at the request of the 
plaintiff, discontinued the payment of premiums on 
said contract after the said payment of December 
29, 1937. 
That the said contract of plaintiff with the 
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of 
America is not subject to cancellation or forfeiturP. 
\by failure of the insured to pay the premiums there-
on. That the annuity under the contract is payable 
to the annuitant personally as long as he shall live, 
:and at his demise to his heirs. That the policy is 
not assignable by the annuitant. That the plai.n-
;tiff is the owner and holder of said contract ttnd 
entitled to all benefits accruing thereunder notwitb-
·standing the cessation of premium payments. 
That on or about the 21st day of March, 19~8, 
,plaintiff made and filed an application with the 
'Retirement Board for membership in the Utah: 
State Teachers' Retirement System pursuant to 
the provisjons of Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah, 
1937. That a hearing on said application was had 
on the 18th day of April, 1938. That at said hear-
ing plaintiff appeared in person and by J. Lambert 
Gibson, his attorney. That the Retirement Board, 
being the identical persons named as defendants 
above, after hearing and receiving the evidence in-
troduced by the applicant (plaintiff above), duly 
made in writing its Findings of Fact and Conclu· 
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sions of Law and Decision, whereby the said Retire-
ment Board found and decided that the applicant 
{plaintiff above) was not eligible for membership 
in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement System. 
The plaintiff, not being satisfied with the de-
cision of the Retirement Board rejecting his appli-
cation for membership, on the 19th day of April, 
1939 instituted an action in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, for 
a declaratory judgment, wherein the identical par-
ties above named were made defendants and where-
in the identical claims of the plaintiff against the 
defendants were tried and determined by said court, 
and on the 15th day of June, 1939, the said Distrjct 
Court made and entered its decree dismissing the 
petition of plaintiff. That no appeal was ever' taken 
from said decree and ever since its rendition and 
entry has been and is now in full force and effect. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff on page six of his brief says: ''This 
is an action by the plaintiff against the defendants 
to force them to accept the plaintiff as a member 
of said system . . . '' ·While in truth and fact 
it is not an action to force anybody o·r anything but 
merely a proceeding pursuant to the issuance of a 
Writ of Certioari by this Court to review the rec· 
ord of proceedings of the Retirement Board in the 
matter of the application of the plaintiff for mem-
bership in the Utah State 'reachers' Retirement 
System to determine from the face of the record 
whether the Retirement Board has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or has not proceeded according to thP 
ossential requirements of the law. The jurisdiction 
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of the Retirement Board and the procedure it must 
follow are defined in the law. 
Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah, 1937. 
Section 104-67-8, R. S. 1933, relating to the 
·Writ of Certiorari, provides: 
''The review upon this writ cannot be ex-
tended further than to determine whether 
the inferior tribunal, Board or officer ha~ 
regularly pursued the authority of such 
tribunal, board or officer.'' 
The great weight of .authority in this country 
is to the effect that under statutes such as ours a 
Writ of Review will extend no farther than to de-
termine whether the inferior court or tribunal has 
exceeded its jurisdiction either by want of having 
acquired jurisdiction of the parties or not having-
acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter, and does 
not authorize the Supreme Court to review the judg-
ment or record for irregularities or errors com-
mitted within the jurisdiction. 
Pintock v. Kimball, District Judge, 64 
Utah 4; 228 P. 221. 
Batley v. Ritchie, 73 Utah 320; 273 P. 969. 
University of Utah v. Industrial Com., 64 
Utah 273; 229 P. 1103. 
Ba.ge v. Com. Nat'l Bk, 38 Utah 440; 112 
P. 816. 
The Utah State Teachers' Retirement System 
·was created by Chapter 85, Session La.ws of Utah, 
1937, and by Section 3 is designated the "Teachers' 
Retirement Act.'' 
Section 3, (3) of the Act provides: 
'' 'Teacher' shall mean any person who is 
serving under a legal certificate as a legally 
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qualified teacher in a public day or evening 
school or as a superintendent, or super-
vising executive, or educational admin-
istrator of public schools, or librarian and 
shall include teachers with and without a 
certificate who are employed by any State 
educational institution supported and con-
trolled by the State, and persons with or 
without a certificate who are employed on 
the staff of the State superintendent of 
public instruction to render service of an 
educational nature. In all cases of doubt 
tJ: e retirement board hereinafter created 
shall determine whether any person IS a 
teacher as defined in this act. '' 
Section 3, ( 4): 
" '~[ember' shall mean any person included 
in the membership of the system as pro-
vided in Sections 11 and 13 of this act.'' 
Section 8 creates the Retirement Board, and in 
part provides : 
''The retirement system shall be managed 
exclusively by a retirement board hereby 
created, . . . Said board shall choose one 
of its members as president, and shall em-
ploy a secretary and consulting actuary ,and 
such clerical and other assistance as may 
be necessary . . . 
''The Retirement Board ~hall have the sole 
power and authority to hear and dete.rmine 
all facts pertaining to applications for ben-
efits under the retirement system and all 
matters pertaining to the administration 
thereof ... '' 
Section 9 provides : 
''The retirement board shall exercise the 
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powers and perform the duties conferred 
on it by this act, and in addition thereto: 
(e) Shall determine the service rendered 
by members in the status requisite to mem-
bership herein to be credited toward qual-
ification for retirement and shall fix retire_ 
ment allowances ... '' 
:Section 10 provides : 
"A fund is hereby created to be designated 
as the Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
fund . . . The retirement board shall have 
exclusive control of the administration and 
investment of said fund . . . '' 
Section 11 provides.: 
'' vVi th the exception of those teachers who 
are excluded from membership by the pro-
visions of Section 12 hereof, all teachers 
shall become members of the retirement 
system as follows : 
'' (a) Every teacher who is employed in 
the public schools of this State on July 1, 
1937 shall become a teacher of the retire-
ment system on that date." 
'Section 12 provides : 
The following teachers shall be excluded 
from membership in the retirement system: 
(b) Every teacher who is the holder of a 
retirement ·annuity contract with the 
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association 
of America or with anv other private or-
ganization or company,~ in which the State 
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof con-
tributes part of the premium, under said 
contract; provided~ however, that every 
such teacher, upon ceasing to be a holder 
of such contract and being otherwise 
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eligible to membership in this system, shall 
forthwith become a member of the system." 
Section 4 provides : 
''An applicant for a benefit hereunder shall 
have the right to demand a hearing before 
the board and shall huve the right to 
appear personally and he represented by 
counsel or by a friend. Any applicant may 
file an application for rehearing of any 
applieation, whether for a benefit here-
under or retirement, 'within thirty days. 
after written notice of the de-termination 
by the retirement board has been sent by 
registered mail to the applicant or his 
attorney of record, upon any of the follow-
ing grounds : 
"(a) That the board acted without and in 
excess of its powers. 
"(b) That the order, division or award 
was procured by fraud. 
'• (c) That the evidence does not justify . 
the determination of the board. 
" (d) That the applicant has discovered 
new evidence rna te·rial to him which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered or procured at the hearing. 
"The determiation of the retirement board 
on any application for rehearing shall be 
made within one hundred eighty days after 
the filing thereof, or said application shall 
be deemed denied and such determination 
shall be final and conclusive and it shall 
have no jurisdiction to entertain any sub-
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sequent application regarding the same 
matter.'' 
Section 21 provides : 
'' . . . For the purpose of this section, the 
holder of a retirement annuity contract 
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity 
Association of America or with any other 
private organization or company, in which 
the State of Utah, or any subdivision there-
of contributes part of the premium under 
said contract, shall be considered per-
manent separation from service in status 
requisite to membership 'herein. . . . '' 
Under the law there is no question as to thE' 
creation of the retirement system and the Retire-
ment Board and the powers of the board. The only 
questions therefore to be considered by this Court 
are whether the Retirement Board acquired juris-
diction of the person of the plaintiff and had juris-
diction of the subject matter. The record of the 
proceedings had before the Retirement Board show 
that the plaintiff filed his application for member-
ship; that the application disclosed he was a holder 
of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & An-
nuity Association of America; that a hearing on 
his application before the Retirement Board was 
duly set, noticed and held; that the plaintiff per-
sonally appeared at said hearing and offered evi-
dence and was also represented by couns.el; that the 
Retirement Board took the matter under advisement 
and thereafter made findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and rendered a decision rejecting the 
!application of the plaintiff; ·and that notice of the 
decision was duly served on the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff having personally submitted to the juris-
diction of the Retiren1ent Board and the law giving 
it power to determine the matter of his eligibility 
to membership, it is dPfinitely and conclm:;ively 
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established, it seems to us, that the Retirement 
Board acquired jurisdiction of the person of the 
plaintiff and had jurisdiction of the subject matter 
of the controversy. 
The plaintiff takes the position that he auto-
matically became a member of the Retirement Sys-
tem and that the Retirement Board had no right, 
power or jurisdiction to determine his eligibility for 
membership. A mere cursory reading of the law 
will convince anyone that such a position is un-
tenable. If true, then the legislative enactment in-
vesting the Retirement Board with power to de-
termine in all cases of doubt whether a person is 
a teacher as defined in the act is meaningless. By 
that enactment the legislature recognized the fact 
-that there would be questions on the eligibility of 
some teachers requiring investigation, hearing and 
determination, and, therefore, gave the Retirement 
Board power to investigate, hear and determine 
those questions. By the provisions of Section 12 
of the act certain teachers are excluded from mem-
bership. The question of whether or not a teacher 
comes within the excluded class must be determined 
by the Retirement Board. Any teacher claiming 
he is not within the excluded class must bear the 
burden of proving it. The plaintiff has not donP 
so. 
The plaintiff further contends that there is no 
provision in the act which authorizes a hearing by 
the Retirement Board to determine membership. 
When you consider that memb1:l'rship is the vital 
thing called "The life of the retirement system'' 
and that all the benefits afforded by the benevolent 
provisions of the act flow only from membership, 
it is most eminently clear that the legislature in-
tended that the doors to the retirement benefits 
could not automatically open to every teacher, and 
consequently was careful to provide that 
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''In all cases of doubt the Retirement Board 
shall determine whether any person is a 
teacher as defined in the Act. '' 
The word '' teacher '' therefore, as used in the 
Act, is synonymous with the word "member," 
for only teachers coming within the provisions of 
the act are entitled to membership. Subdivision 4 
of Section 3. Without any other delegation of 
power to the Retirement Board the absolute power 
given to determine whether any person, is. a teacher 
as defined in the Act unequivocally authorizes the 
Retirement Board to hear and decide· all questions 
relating to eligibility for membership. But, coupled 
with that power are the powers given to the Retire-
ment Board by Section 4 of the Act above quoted. 
Plaintiff claims that that part of Section 4 reading 
"An applicant for a benefit hereunder shall have 
the right to demand a hearing before the Board and 
~hall have the right to appear personally and be 
represented by counsel or by a friend,'' does not 
apply to an application for membership, becam::e, 
be says, benefits come afterwards. 
How plain this contention makes plaintiff's 
position, namely: "If I can slide through the gates 
of me·mbership I am assured all the benefits of thP. 
act.'' Without membership there can be no ben-
~fits. An application for membership therefore· in-
cludes all benefits, and after membership granted 
it is only a matter of when a member snail r~ceive 
and enjoy his benefits, and he makes thai known 
by applying for his earned benefits. A hearing on 
that application is also provided for in said Sec-
tion 4. ·we contend that the provisions of said Sec-
tion 4 are not limited to applications for earned 
benefits arising after membership. The section in 
part Rays that ''Any applicant may file an applica-
tion for rehearing of any application, whether for 
a benefit hereunder or retirem~nt." Significance 
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must be given to the broad language: ''Any appli-
cation, whether for a benefit hereunder or retire-
ment.'' Certainly an application for membership 
is an application filed pursuant to the terms of the 
act and is for all the benefits .afforded by the act. 
The plaintiff says in his brief that he filed his appli-
cation for membership pursuant to the provisions 
of the act. At any rate, the Retirement Board under 
its unquestioned power to determine whether any 
person is a teacher followed the procedure outlined 
in Section 4 relating to plaintiff's application for 
membership, and the plaintiff made no objection 
thereto but appeared in person and testified and 
offered evidence, and failed to filP- an application 
for rehearing on any of the broad grounds specified 
in the act, or at all. 
The plaintiff further contends that the Retire-
ment Board has no authority to hold a judicial hear-
i:!lg and that the Board is not a quasi-judicial body 
because the act does not -provide for such a hear-
ing. The express provisions of the act negative 
such contention. Section 3 (3) gives the Board 
power to determine whether any person is a teacher, 
and Section 8 gives the Board the sole power and 
authority to hear and determine all facts pertain-
ing to applications for benefits under the retire-
ment system and all matters pertaining to the ad-
ministration thereof. A reference to these legis-
lative powers alone would seem to establish con-
clusively that the contention of plaintiff is not sus-
tainable. The wo:rd '~determine" has been judi-. 
rially defined to mean: ''To settle by authoritative 
or judicial sentence;" "To ascertain or state def-
initely;" "To perform a judicial act;'' and "To 
adjudge.'' 
18 c. J. 985, 86. 
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The term "Judicial Act" has been defined .. as fol-
lows: 
''An act is judicial when it requires the 
exercise of judgment or discretion by one 
or more persons when acting as public 
officers in an official character, in a man-
ner which se,ems to them just and equit-
able.'' 
34 C. J. 1178, Note 33. 
''An act done by a member of the judicial 
department of government in construing 
the law or applying it to a state of facts 
presented for the determination of the 
rights of the parties thereunder.'' 
34 c. J. 1181. 
Plaintiff undoubtedly is right when he says 
that the Retirement Board does not have power to 
hold a purely judicial hearing. The judicial power 
in its fullest extent belongs, of course, to the judi-
cial department or the courts, not to boards or 
officers. But, we have in Utah a number of boards 
exercising quasi-judicial powers and the Teachers' 
Retirement Board is one of them. A quasi-judicial 
power is one imposed upon an officer or board in-
-volving the exercise of discretion, judicial tin its 
nature, in connection with, and as incidental to, the 
administration of matters assigned to or entrusted 
to said officer or board. 
34 C. J. 1180, Note 72. 
Quasi-judicial powers involving judgment and dis-
cretion are often, and must necessarily be exercised 
by administrative and executive bodies and officers. 
34 C. J. 1180, Note 72. 
If such were not the case then the Retirement Board 
could not determine or render a decision as to 
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whether a person is a teacher and could not hear 
and detennine ~ll facts pertaining to applications, 
and consequently would be a dummy, instead of an 
active body determining facts and rendering de-
cisions in accordance with and within the orbits of 
the powers gi.Yen it and in accordance with the 
obligations imposed upon it and entrusted to it by 
the law. The Retirement Board has power to hear 
and determine certain matters as does the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah. This Court has many 
times held that the Industrial Commission is a 
quasi-judicial body. 
University of Utah v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah 
273, 76; 229 P. 1103, 
this Court, in speaking of the Industrial Commi s-
sion said: 
In 
''The Industrial C01nmission is a tribunal 
of limited authority. Its power in any case 
must be found in express law or necessary 
inference therefrom.'' 
Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah 
394, 405; 174 P. 825, 
this Court, among other things, said: 
In 
''No doubt the Commission may, under 
certain circumstances, hear evidence and 
may determine the facts and apply the law 
to them when found . . . '' 
Utah Fuel Company v. Ind. Com .. 57 Utah 
246-51; 194 P. 122, this Court said: 
''Every administrative body, if it is to 
function at all, must have soine power and 
jurisdiction to determine for itself whether 
or not it may proceed in a given case, and 
this we think may be done without usurping 
the functions of the Court, so long as it 
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does not act arbitrarily or in excess of the 
express powers conferred by legislative 
enactment.'' 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com., 61 
Utah 16-20; 210 P.127, this Court said: 
'' The Industrial Commission of this State 
is an administrative body. Some of its 
acts, in fact many of its acts, are quasi-
judicial . . . '' 
D. & R. G. W. RR. Co. v. Ind. Com., 74 
Utah 316-20; 279 P. 612, this Court 
said: 
'' vVben the Industrial Commission hears 
and determines an application for an award 
of compens,ation, it exercises quasi-judicial 
functions. Its awards are in effect judg-
ments." 
The Retirement Board occupies a like status 
with the Industrial Commission and has power to 
hear controversies, find facts and apply the law 
to the facts in all matters coming within the express 
powers given to it by the legislature and those neces-
arily inferred therefrom. In the instant case' the 
plaintiff made application for membershjp in the 
retirement system and therein disclosed that he 
was a holder of a contract with the Teachers' In-
surance & Annuity Association of America. A 
hearing was had on that application at which the 
plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel and 
testified and offered in evidence his said contract. 
From the testimonv and evidence the Retirement 
Board found as fa~ts that the plaintiff was em-
ployed by the University of Utah; that he ente,red 
into a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & 
nuity Association of America; that the contract re-
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qui red the payment of regular monthly premiums; 
that the contract '"as not subject to forfeiture be-
cause of the failure to pay premiums, but upon 
failure to pay any regular monthly premium the 
policy would automatically become fully paid up for 
an annuity payable as the orig-inal annuity was pay-
able, but for a reduced amount; that the contraCJt 
could be reinstated to its original status. at any 
time, upon payment of the delinquencies ; that all 
premiums due under the said contract were paid by 
the plaintiff and the University of Utah from No-
vember 1, 1923 to December 29, 1937; that the plain-
tiff and the University ceased making premium pay-
ments after the payment of December 29, 1937; and 
that the plaintiff retained said contract so as to 
claim and receive the deferred annuity provided 
therein on the basis of the contributions made to 
December 29, 1937; and then the Retirement Board 
made conclusions of law, or applied the law, to those 
facts and rendered a decision denying the applica-
tion of p1aintiff for membership. All, we clairr1) 
within the powers and jurisdiction of the Retirement 
Board under the laws hereinbefore quoted and 
found in 
Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah 1937. 
The plaintiff takes the position that the Re-
tirement Board was without power to ascertain or 
construe the contents of the contract with the 
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of 
America and relies upon Continental Gas Co. v. 
Ind. Com., 61 Utah 16; 210 P. 127. A mere casual 
reading of the case shows conclusively that the 
facts are wholly dissimilar to the facts in the in-
stant case. In that case a man lost his life as the 
result of an accident. An award was made by the 
Industrial Commission and the Continental Cas ... 
n::llty Company questioned the power of the Com-
miRRion to require it to pay the award on the 
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grounds that the policy issued by it insured the 
Elaterite Varnish & Rubber Company; tl-utt the 
n1ine in which the deceased was working was oper-
ated hy one R. M. Pope under a contract with the 
rubber company, and that the deceased was an em_ 
ployee of Mr. Pope at the time of the accident. The 
Court said: "Such being the admitted facts, could 
the Industrial Commission disregard the wording 
of the policy that it insured employe,es of the rub-
ber company and make an award for an employee 
of one not named in the policy~" Clearly it could 
;not, and the the Court so held, saying: "It is not 
'Ve·sted with power to reform a contract or make a 
new contract to conform with the intent of the par-
ties. That power belongs to another forum." 
There is no objection on our part to that decision, 
but it has no application to plaintiff's case and 
does not act to deprive the Teachers' Retirement 
Board of power to apply the law to facts as found 
hy it in cases within its jurisdiction. Answering-
the first point raised by the Continental Casualty 
Company in that case, this Court said: 
''The question of dependency being ad-
mitted, the issuance and delivery of the 
policy also being admitted, and the acci-
dent happening within the time covered by 
the policy, the Industrial Commission was 
without authority to determine or hold 
that its terms were not in force and bind-
ing upon the casualty company at the time 
of the accident. . . . The policy was. he-
fore the Commission. The Commission 
had no power to do othe·rwise than to en-
force- and to apply its terms as the same 
appear in the policy.'' 
This ruling shows conclusively that the Com-
'mission had power to read, study and construe· pol-
icies of in~unuwe affrctin~· employees within its 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
jurisdiction and to enforce the terms of those pol-
icies. That is just what the Teachers' Retirement 
Board did in Mr. Gibson's case. The Teachers' 
Retirement Act requires the Board to examine the 
policies issued by the Teachers' Insurance & An-
nuity Association of America and determine from 
their terms whether or not a teacher is a holder 
of such a policy. The Retirement Board did it, 
found the facts and applied the law. 
TEACHERS EXCLUDED 
The construction given to Section 12 of the 
Retirement Act by the Retirement Board, whereby 
certain teachers are excluded from membership is 
correct, we believe. Subdivision (b) creates three 
definite situations of exclusion, namely: 
1. 
Every teacher who is the holder of a retire-
ment annuity contract with the Teachers' Insur-
ance & Annuity Association of America. 
2. 
Or (the word "or'' being an alternative and 
being used as a conjunction marking an alternative 
and not joining, uniting- or connecting several words· 
or phrases of the same class) with any other pri-
vate organization or company~ in which the State 
of Utah, or any suhdivision thereof, contributes 
part of the premium, under said contract. 
3. 
Provided, however, that ever1J such teacher, 
upon ceasing to be a holder of such contract and 
being otherwiRe eligible to membership in this sys-
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tern, shall forthwith become a member of the 
system. 
Under the first situation no one will gainsay 
that the plaintiff was a holder of such a contract 
at the time the Retirement Act took effect, namely, 
March 3, 1937, and that he remained a full-fledged 
holder by the joint payment of premiums by him-
self and the University of Utah until Dec-ember 29, 
1937, when payment of premiums were discontinued. 
It is absolutely certain that he was ineligible during 
all of that time, and when you consider the pro-
visions of Section 21 of the act relating to termina-
tion of membership, is it not equally certain that 
l1e became permanently ineligible by being the 
holder of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance 
& Annuity Association of America after the rreach-
ers' Retirement Act became effective~ That part 
of Section 21 applicable here is the part heretoforP 
quoted in this brief. 
This quoted part of Section 21 means, if it 
means anything at all, that the holding or owning 
of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance: & An-
nuity Association of America is tantamount to 
permanent separation from service, and certainly 
one separated permanently from service is not en-
titled to membership. It will be noted that the law 
does not declare that the geparation from service 
is contingent or shall endure only while the State 
or some subdivision thereof contributes part of the 
premium, hut states in unequivocal manda.tory 
terms that the separation shall be permanent, and, 
therefore, the words ''In which the State of Utah 
or any subdivision thereof contributes a part of thP 
premium'' are only descriptive of a situation or a 
status. The plaintiff, therefore, at the time the 
law took effect was in the status of those teachers 
permanently separated from the service, and, 
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under the law, was not a teacher qualified for mem-
bership. It will be here remembered that the law 
gives the Retirement Board power to determine in 
all cases of doubt whether any person is a teacher 
as defined in the act. 
With the second situation we are not concerned 
unless it be determined that the words. "in which 
the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof con-
tributes a part of the premium, under said con-
tract'' relate back to and must be deemed a part of 
the first situation. We do not believe that such is 
1:he case, as the two situations are not connected 
with a copulative- conjunction, as plaintiff eon-
tends, but with a conjunction expressing an alter-
native. But. for the sake of argument, assume that 
plaintiff's contention is correct, then it would 
seem that the proviso following the second situa-
tion goes right through everythinng preceding it and 
modifies both the first and second situations with 
all that it means. If it does not, then the first sit-
uation stands alone and is a complete bar to the 
contention of plaintiff. It is a rule of statutory con-
sb11ction that a proviso should be confined to the 
antecedent next preceding it unless a contrary con-
tention clearly appears. 
State v. Quale, 26 Utah 26-30; 71 P. 1060. 
Under this rule the antecedent of the terms ''every 
such teacher" found in the proviso would be lim-
ited to the teachers named in the second situation. 
But in 
Meat Co. v. Mining Co., 36 Utah 145; 103 
P. 254, 
this Court laid down and applied the rule: 
''That what is termed a proviso is not 
really such, if not restricting or modifying· 
only what is previously said in the sectioni 
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but being intended to apply to the whole 
chapter, so that for the purpose of arriving 
at the true intention such proviso should 
be considered as a separate section, the 
mere fact of it being termed a proviso and 
appended to a particular section not being 
controlling.'' 
Under this rule it would seem that the term "every 
such teacher'' was intended to apply to all of Sub-
section (b) of said Section 12 of the act. 
The question therefore is ''when does a teacher 
cease to be a holder of such a contract~)' The an-
swer to that question can be found only in the con-
tract itself. As found by the Retirement Board, 
the contract cannot be forfeited, cancelled or 
assigned. The discontinuance of payments of 
premiums does riot forfeit or cancel the contract, 
but on the contrary, causes the contract to auto-
matically become paid up for an annuity payable 
as the original annuity was .Payable, except for 
such reduced monthly amount as the premium 
thereon will purchase. Under such circumstancef:l 
how can the plaintiff successfully claim that he has 
ceased to be the holder of the contract. He will and 
must receive the reduced annuity by reason of the 
contract. As long as a pe·rson is receiving benefits 
issuing from a contract, and that contract is the 
very foundation of those benefits, the contract is 
not v,riped out and does not cease to exist, and he is 
still the holder of it. Such is. fundamentally, 
logically and indisputably true. In 
32 C. J. 1300, Section 530, it is said: 
''Failure or default in the payment of 
premiums . . . does not, in the absence of 
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a contractual proVISIOn, avoid or forfeit 
the policy of insurance. '' 
That rule applies here ·and is a complete an-
swer to the contention of plaintiff. The contractual 
provisions of the contract in question are all against 
avoidance, forfeiture, cancellation and assignment. 
Again the words "in which the State of Utah, or 
any subdivision thereof, contributes a part of the 
premium,'' if they actually modify the first situa-
tion, are merely descriptive of a class of ineligible 
teachers and do not limit or abridge the meaning 
of the term ''upon ceasing to be a holder of such 
contract.'' This is true because any teacher hold-
ing a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & An-
nuity Association of America to which the State 
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, was not con-
tributing or had not contributed any part of the 
premium would not be ineligible. 
Plaintiff further contends that because the 
term "to which the State of Utah, or any sub-
division thereof, is contributing a part of the 
J··remium" is in the present tense, that a mere dis-
continuance of the payment of the premiums on the 
contract would make him eligible. If the phrase 
is merely descriptive of a class of ineligible teach-
ers, then its tense is immaterial. ·We must assume 
that the legislature in enacting this exclusion stat-
ute knew that the State of Utah had contributed 
out of the appropriations made by it to the Univer-
sity of Utah large sums of money for the special 
benefit of certain teachers, and that those teachers 
were the ones holding contracts with the Teach-
0rs' Insurance- & Annuity Association of America. 
We must also assume that when the legilature en-
rtcted that part of the Teachers' Retirement Act 
relating to credit for prior service, Section 9 (e), 
it knew of the contributions made by it to teachers 
holding contracts with the Teachers' Insurance & 
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Annuity Association of America and that it the·re-
fore excluded those teachers who were the benefi-
ciaries of those contributions, and, because the State 
of Utah was then contributing and the premiums 
were payable monthly in advance, the language 
used was necessarily in the present tense. This in-
tention is fortified when you consider that the 
University of Utah paid one-half of the premiums 
on plaintiff's policy, or One Hundred Eighty 
($180) Dollars a year for fourteen years and two 
months, or a total of Two Thousand Five Hundred 
Fifty ($2,550) Dollars. To let such a holder of a 
contract where the State, through the university, 
has contributed such a large part of the considera-
tion, assuring such a holder a double annuity at 
the expense of the State, come into the Utah State 
Teachers' Retirement System would be in violation 
of the very spirit and wording of the law, and would 
work a great injustice on those teachers who have 
not been so favored by the State, especially in those 
cases (such as the plaintiff's) where many years of 
credit for prior service follows membership. As 
found by the Re·tirement Board, under the pro-
visions in the plaintiff's policy with the Teachers' 
Tn;;;;nrance & Annuity Association of America, the 
policy is t•Ubject to reinstatement at any time. It 
seems certain that plaintiff, after acquiring mem-
bership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
System, would immediately reinstate his contract, 
and thus he would obtain indirectly that which he 
is prevented from having directly, namely, member-
ship in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem while still a holder of a policy of insurance 
with that association, on which the State has ·paid 
one-half of the premiums, and entitled to many 
years' credit for prior service toward qualification 
for retirement in the Rtate association. vVe do not 
believe the legislature under the wording of the 
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law intended to give him both the premiums on the 
policy with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity 
Association of America, assuring him a double an-
nuity at the expense of the State, :and the large 
credit for service in the State system, the legis-
lature undoubtedly knowing and believing that the 
large amount paid by the university for the ben-
€fit of the insured could not be recovered back 
and the insured could not be deprived of the ben-
efits thereof. 
Plaintiff says in his brief that he has done 
everything that it is possible for him to do to dis-
possess himself of the contract. All he has done 
is to discontinue payments of premium and that 
does not dispossess him of it. It stands to rea:son 
that he will not dispossess himself of the benefitH 
to be derived from that contract. He cannot do 
so because the annuity therein provided must be 
paid to the annuitant and not to his assignees. The 
Retirement Board found that he had discontinued 
premium payments but that he had retained said 
contract so as to claim and receive the deferred 
annuity provided therein. 
Plaintiff states on pag·e 14 of his brief that 
the amount to which he would be entitled from the 
Utah State Teachers' R:etirement System is deter-
mined by the years of prior sevice and that 
the years of prior service are de,termined 
not by the number of years which he has been a 
teacher, but by the number of years which he has 
been a teacher and not the holder of a retirement 
annuity contract with the Teachers' Insuranee & 
Annuity Association of America in which the State 
of Utah contributed a part of the premiums. \Ve 
submit that there is no provision in the law so de-
claring. If the legislature so intended, then it 
would not have excluded the holders of those con-
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tracts from membership, but would have declared 
that they were entitled to membership but could 
not have credit for the time they were holders of 
such contracts. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Plaintiff devotes a good part of his brief, pages 
1.6, 17, 18 and 19, to an attack on the constitution-
ality of the Teachers' Retirement Act, and this not-
withstanding he is claiming membership in the Utah 
State Teachers' Retirement System and all the ben-
efits issuing from it under the law. It is a univer-
sally established rule of law that a party cannot 
assert a right under a statute and at the same time 
question its constitutionality. 
Leva v. Utah Fuel Co., 58 Utah 388; 199 
P. 659. 
Further, a petition for a Writ of Certiorari must 
contain an assignment of errors relied upon. Mat-
ters not assigned as errors will not be reviewed. 
11 C. J. 151, Sec. 150. 
Griffiths v. Justice's Court, 35 Utah 443-54; 
100 P. 1064. 
The soundness of the two foregoing rules is glar-
ingly apparent. The plaintiff in his application for 
the writ of certiorari does not re,ly, naturally, upon 
the unconstitutionality of the Act, and there is no 
assignment of error relating the·reto in his applica-
tion. At no time has he ever presented tlie question 
PXCept in his brief to this Court. It appears that 
the plaintiff suddenly determined that lf he could 
not get what he wanted out of the retirement act 
he would see to it that no one· else got anything 
But, such a coveted malign achievement is not open 
to him. It is further a universal rule that every 
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presumption will be indulged in favor of the con-
stitutionality of a statute. 
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah 
County, SO Utah -!91; 15 P. (2d) 633. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
The record before the Court shows that on 
the 19th day of April, 1939 the plaintiff petitioned 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, for a declaratory judgment, 
involving the identical questions raised and argued 
by him in his petition for Writ of Certiorari issued 
by this Court, and in his brief filed herein in sup-
port of his petition, and wherein the identical per-
sons were defendants. After hearing the cause on 
the merits the Court rendered its decision dismisS-
ing the petition of plaintiff. No appeal was taken 
from that judgment. We contend that that judg-
ment disposes of the very issues presented hy the 
plaintiff in this review and i~ binding on the plain-
tiff and on this Court. The plaintiff s,tates in his 
brief that the case was dismissed at the request 
of the defendants on the ground that the court was 
without jurisdiction. There is nothing in the rec-
ord to so show or in the decision rendered bv the 
court. The decision speaks for itself and sho~s on 
its face that the case was tried on its merlts. De-
claratory judgments have the force and effect of 
a final judgment or decree. 
Section 104-64-1, Revised Statutes. 1933. 
A judgment dismissing a complaint is final if it 
<·xpress.ly declares or if it appears by the judgment 
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roll that the judgment was rendered upon the 
merits. 
Section 104-30-7. 
P~aintiff 's remarks (page 20 of his brief) con-
cerning the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
made and filed by the Retirement Board are not 
only immaterial but wholly untrue. The certified 
.record to this Court shows the date on which they 
were made and filed and that record imports 
verity. 
LACHES 
In answer to defendants' charge of laches the 
plaintiff says on page twenty-one of his brief, in 
substance, that under the law he was a member of 
the retirement system and as such he was not re-
quired to do or cause the courts to do anything in 
reg1ard to said system until he applied for benefits, 
which, he says, he has not done. Yet, he is the 
moving spirit in this attempted review, and on page 
six of his brief he says, in substance, that his appli-
cation for the ·Writ of Review is an action brought 
by him against the defendants to force them to 
accept the plaintiff as a member of the retirement 
sys,tem and to do for him the acts required of them 
by the retire·ment act. It is plain that neither 
statement is true, and such expressions by the 
plaintiff are wholly irrelevant to the question of 
laches. 
While Section 104-67-2 states that the Writ of 
Certiorari may issue at any time after judgment, 
.still there ought to be a time when a party through 
hie negligence or laches should be denied the writ. 
The judgment of the Retirement Board was render-
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ed on the 4th day of :May, 1938, and became final 
on the 7th day of June, 1938. The applicant, in-
stead of applying to this Court or to the District 
.Court for a \Yrit of Certiorari, filed au action in the 
~ehird Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Utah, against the identical defendants O!.l 
the 19th day of April, 1939., for a declaratory judg-
ment. He remained silent and inert for ten months 
and ten days before going to the District Court for 
said declaratory judgment. Having lost in that 
action on the 15th day of June, 1939, he remained 
silent and inert until the 24th day of January, 
1940, when he filed his application with this Court 
for a \Y rit of Certiorari. He failed and neglected 
to apply to this Court for a Writ of D~rtiorari for 
one year, seven months and seventeen days after 
the judgment of the Retirement Board became final. 
In 
State Ex rel Tumwater P. & W. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 105 P. 815, 
the Supreme Court of Washington ruled: 
"While the statute fixes no time within 
which a ·Writ of Review must he applied 
for, we have held by analogy that the writ 
must be applied for within the time fixed 
for taking an appeal." (Citing cases). 
To the same effect is 
State v. Kuykendale, 236 P. 99 (Wash.) 
The Supreme Court of Idaho said, in th~? 
case of 
Pullman Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 171 P. 260: 
'' 'fhe statute does not limit the time with-
in which a Writ of Review may be pros-
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ecuted. Under the s,tatute an appeal to 
the Supreme Court must be taken within 
ninety days after the entry of the judg-
ment appealed from. In the absence of a 
statute limiting the time within which an 
application for Writ of Revie,w may be 
prosecuted, the rule is that it must be 
applied for within a reasonable time, which 
will be deemed to be the time within which 
an appeal may be taken in appealable 
cases.'' 
To the same effect is 
Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 
32 P. 322' (Calif.) 
For the reasons hereinabove expressed, and on 
the authorities cited in support thereof, the prayer 
of the defendants in their answer to plaintiff's 
application for the ·Writ of Certiorari should be 
granted. 
Very respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
GROVER S. GILES, 
Asst. Attorney General of 
Utah. 
WM. A. IDLTON, 
Special Couns.el. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
Received typewritten copy of the foregoing 
brief this 20th day of March, 1940. 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
MARL D. GIBSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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